How Napoleon became 'King of Italy'

Author(due south) : HICKS Peter

How Napoleon became 'King of Italy'
Andrea Appiani: Napoleon Male monarch of Italy, Vienne, Kunsthistorisches Museum, Gemäldegalerie

Napoleon'south period equally chief magistrate in Italia began in Jan 1802 when the thirty-member commission charged with finding a president for the newly created Italian republic finally managed to persuade Napoleon to play that role. But Napoleon was an absentee president, with vice-president Francesco Melzi (and the latter's homo in Paris,)(Alain Pillepich, Napoléon et les Italiens, Nouveau Monde Editions, 2003, p. 54.) much to the ailment of the other European powers, particularly Austria, with her ancestral designs on northern Italy. Just with the proclamation of Empire in France, in May 1804, it was clear to politicians of the fourth dimension, both French and Italian, that Italy could no longer remain equally a republic. And so, on 17 March 1805, almost a year later the annunciation of Empire in France (and later on two faux starts), the Italian republic became the Kingdom of Italy – a particularly misleading expression, since the territory included in this realm was not the peninsular every bit a whole just merely Lombardy and the Emilia Romagna – with Napoleon equally its king. The formal, ceremonial effect of this political determination was the coronation in Milan. When he took the Atomic number 26 Crown of the Lombards, Napoleon over again underlined his Carolingian credentials (and dared anyone else to take the kingdom from him). ("Iddio me la diede, guai a chi la toccherà", ("God gave it to me, woe to him who touches it") were the words spoken by Charlemagne when he received the crown as male monarch of the Lombards in 774. They became the ritual words spoken by all those who received the 'Iron Crown of the Lombards'.)

What was Napoleon'southward attitude towards northern Italian republic at this time? The remark made past Napoleon in the fall of 1801 is rich with inferences: "I go to Lyons. The Cisalpine people accept asked me to forestall the argue and agitation which would surely result if they gave themselves a constitution. I thought it good to agree to this and to assist in the formation of a state whose independence was bought with French claret". (Recorded by Pierre-Louis Roederer in Oeuvres du comte P. L. Roederer / publiées par son fils le baron A.M. Roederer,… – Paris : Firmin Didot, 1853-1859, vol. 3, p. 428, hereafter Roederer, Oeuvres.) These 3 sentences reveal the broad lines of what remained Napoleon's policy guidelines regarding Italy. Showtime, Bonaparte did not trust the Italians to govern themselves; second, he very definitely wanted to have a say in the redaction of the constitution of the new republic; and third, Italy belonged to France and more specifically to Napoleon, since it was he lone who had conquered information technology. In the end, this threefold concern was to deliquesce into a decision to become 'Male monarch of Italy' in the bound of 1805. This paper aims to consider how far this decision to become king was a long-term goal, how far Italian politicians wanted Napoleon to be rex, and also how serious Napoleon was in offering the crown to his elder brother Joseph in the Dec of 1804.

Italian desires – independence past the back door

In the period when Napoleon was elevated to the imperial status on eighteen May 1804, Italian administrators and regime officials were naturally concerned as to the hereafter state of the Italian Republic. Could information technology remain a republic when the head of state was an emperor? Given that the status quo could not keep, what were the conditions and consequences of the metamorphosis? A key source of data is the correspondence between the Italian regime representative in Paris, Ferdinando Marescalchi, and the vice-president of Italian republic, Francesco Melzi. ( I carteggi di Francesco Melzi d'Eril, Duca di Lodi, La vice-presidenza della Repubblica, vol. VI, Milan 1962, hereafter Melzi, Carteggi.) Marescalchi had already written to Melzi on 1 May, 1804 informing him of the debate in the Tribunat regarding the institution of a hereditary empire, (On 30 April, 1804, in the Tribunat, Curée had proposed the famous motion that Napoleon should become 'Emperor of the French', see La proclamation de l'Empire, Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2001, p. 24-29, and also on the website napoleonica.org http://www.napoleonica.org/proclamation/pro007.html.) noting that this 'accession would exist of importance for the whole of Europe and particularly for us [Italians] who recognise the aforementioned man as head of our government'. (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, letter 1900, p. 158.) Having had a long interview with the Napoleon on seven May, Marescalchi wrote an open alphabetic character dated 9 May to the regime of the Italian Democracy (the Consulta), (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Vi, letter 1925, p. 178-7.) informing them that: "the Kickoff Delegate did not think that the championship 'President' was compatible with his new dignity; although it was possible that he could omit information technology and completely forget about it", an mental attitude which Marescalchi however thought unsafe for Italian prestige and prosperity. The Italian minister also remarked to the Consulta that he had reminded the First Consul that the Italian government had envisaged the height to the imperial dignity in Lyons two years earlier and had demanded of Napoleon his intentions. Marescalchi went on to quote Napoleon's words regarding Italian fears as to its future. "'No i,' Napoleon said, 'is in a amend position to judge than you lot [i.due east., Marescalchi]. Write to the vice-president [Melzi] and say that above all you must follow the general desire, or at least that of the majority. What is about to happen in France will certainly make it possible to see how people volition react in your Commonwealth. After that, the vice-president must consider the question. Then the Consulta must do the aforementioned. And and so they should express their desire. Regardless of this outcome, I tin can see that people were convinced that the [Italian] Constitution needed reforming. Yous need a guarantee, and it is right that I should give you lot one. Do the Italians wish to form a Nation? Let them have i. The important thing is to find 'the expert' and the perception of that practiced. Decide what that good may be. Write to them and tell them that I have no other plan than to contribute to their happiness and to support as much as possible the desire that they will have expressed to me'. He repeated these sentiments several times with that benignity and real concern which he has always shown for us. I insisted that he tell united states at least what was his preferential solution. But he gave no indication of a direction. I too asked him which demonstrations could be offered to him on the occasion of this event, with the greatest promise that they be accepted, and on this subject he replied that had not however formed a clear idea." Marescalchi added that he would not add his own opinions because: "I have too shut a view of the Hero to have whatever other feeling for him than of the admiration, respect and gratitude which he inspires in all those around him.'

But on the same day Marescalchi wrote a private letter to Melzi expressing himself more than freely. (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Half-dozen, letter of the alphabet 1926, pp. 178-180.) He reveals that the commandant of the Italian troops at the Boulogne camp, General Pino had sent to the Italian representative (and to others) an 'Address' to be sent to the First Consul dated xiii Floréal, An XII (3 May): It read: 'The Republic of Italia is the work of your easily, General. You should complete that work. Let the Emperor of France become Male monarch of Italy.' Marescalchi goes on in his alphabetic character to Melzi remarking that luckily no one had connected Pine's enthusiastic outburst – the latter was a renowned hothead – with Marescalchi'south and Melzi's own manoeuvres in the same direction. Marescalchi correctly recognised that the affair was of great importance – indeed and so of import that it made him tremble. He noted that regardless of any change in the system of government of France, "our land will ever exist precarious, and confidence in our future will always diminish if we are to take an opposite direction." He went on: "The Consul has said (and correctly so): 'that whatever projection suggested past him would always contain the original sin that it had been suggested past him and thus seen as an human action of arbitrary sentence, which would damage the rights of Nations. That we must brainstorm past finding out what the penchant of the Nation itself might exist. Just feel has already proved all too well that all those projects enacted according to this fundamental principle bring about poor results. You lot could consult the Electoral Colleges, but if y'all did not present a movement, what result could there be? A host of contradictory opinions would be expressed, and peradventure none of them would be any skilful. And even if there were a good one, people would accuse it of beingness the result of intrigue or influence. What is almost to happen in France will mayhap provide the states with the easiest and safest solution. You must wait to see which natural sentiment arises with respect to an consequence of this sort. Nosotros volition be able to see more clearly if nosotros can give the people a articulate of idea of information technology; so that they can see the effects, consider them, compare them, estimate them, in short so that they tin can advisable them for themselves. Nosotros volition then run into how they are disposed, whether they adopt the principles introduced recently or another system which corrects them and comprises advantages more specific to their position, their interests and their customs…' Tell me what you retrieve. Consult with many people, detect the desires of those who are most enlightened, or with other interested parts of the state. With your support, these ideas could achieve the critical mass nosotros take vainly sought for in the past. Once y'all have presented these ideas to the Consul and he has judged them suitable… all that will remain will be to bring over the others and to determine on a way of execution. This is the program the First Delegate thinks is best…"

Marescalchi then went on to record Napoleon's consideration regarding the complete annexation of Italy. "He [Napoleon] spoke in detail well-nigh the advantages, simply came to no conclusion any as to whether these advantages would exist sufficient to outweigh the loss of the hope of one 24-hour interval beingness a self-contained, contained Nation, the loss of their own magistrates, and the huge and painful efforts the government would accept to make us accept complete amalgamation. He admitted that the instance of Piedmont would certainly not exist a reason for confidence in this respect. And finally he weighed upwards the obstruction of the lack of consent of the other Powers, already profoundly agape at such a jumbo aggrandizement.

He seemed to think that a complete independence ought to exist more amusing to united states. Even so since nosotros lacked everything required in this respect, he judged that if we wished to continue with the Republic, fifty-fifty with a modified constitution, nosotros were not mature enough to be able to avoid falling into the traps which our enemies would ceaselessly lay for united states or to avert being exposed to all the evils of internal dissension which would have brought about not merely our [Melzi's and Marescalchi's] ruin only also that of our institution. If nosotros preferred a monarchical state or a mixed regime, he could not imagine which prince could be chosen, and fifty-fifty if 1 could be found, France would and so accept to be in agreement.

Here arose the idea of turning our eyes towards someone from his family. But even this solution was not exempt from difficulties, in his stance. The first and greatest difficulty for him was that you [Melzi] should not be distanced from a position which you lot have and so nobly occupied and to which y'all were chosen by the general will. The other is that, of those in his family, 1 would perhaps refuse [i.e., Joseph, ed.], some other did not all the same have the necessary experience [i.due east., Louis, ed.] and standing. The conclusion of this was that which I outlined in the open alphabetic character." (In another private letter to Melzi on the same 24-hour interval, Marescalchi returns to the possibility of a member of the Bonaparte family acceding to the Italian throne. Lucien is rejected because of bad blood acquired by his marriage to Alexandrine Bleschamp. "In my opinion – [Marescalchi'south, ed.], setting Joseph to one side – he would pass up it out of mitt." Marescalchi was well acquainted with Joseph, acted equally his literary advisor and was very much of the elder brother's 'political party'. The Italian politician went on: "I think that the virtually suitable would exist Louis, because he is a really good man, without pretensions and non lacking in judgement and character as is thought. It is his son whom the Consul wishes to appoint every bit his successor, despite the fact that he is only 18 months old. Just – for heaven's sake, and between us – Louis is against information technology out of respect to his brothers. […] Y'all see more clearly than I practice. To dig in our heels about remaining a republic would now be madness. That he should leave usa in total liberty would be worse. But he would never do that. So the best solution sees to me to seize the moment and get the best we can for ourselves." Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Half dozen, p. 182.)

Marescalchi then went on to lay out his own opinions on the matter: "Information technology must be the instance that, despite the obstacles created by the different hypotheses, the Kickoff Consul favours ane solution which can more than hands be accommodated to the rest of the political edifice which he is erecting here and which volition be complete in a few days time, without fear that it will be attacked or that it will autumn down; a solution which, to put information technology frankly, must appeal more to him than to the others, and which at the aforementioned fourth dimension could offering to usa a way of getting what nosotros have upward to now desired in vain. I may be wrong, simply I can most see it. I certainly did not dare to advise it to the Consul, but to you I can expound the trouble such as it appears to me. […] Nosotros must prepare the premise that […] with an emperor in France, the idea of a Republic becomes for the states a chimera and near ridiculous. […] The best affair we can do is to take advantage of the situation and so every bit to establish a constitutional monarchy or mixed government, where potency is suitably express. Starting from this principle, I think that nosotros should see this occasion as our best chance for emancipating ourselves and founding a authorities – the solution which at other times y'all idea best for usa.
Having said this, Bonaparte will probably deserve our eternal gratitude and nosotros could not, without doing ourselves a disservice, pass up him. But, even if we were to imagine excessive generosity on his office such that he might renounce this right, I practise not think that information technology would ever be prudent or advantageous to ourselves to provoke that generosity, or even to agree to information technology. As a result, I could non advise this asking nor propose whatever other head than him, as long he deigned to be it. As for the title, it could be one or the other, it is of no importance, provided it was worthy of him.
We must brand our independence in the hereafter our love goal; (As Thierry Lentz has noted (Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire, Paris: Editions Fayard, vol. 1, p. 117) inviting Napoleon to be male monarch was not paradoxical, since it would cut political links with Austria and would also allow the Italians to impose weather condition.) and this is the moment for setting that in motion. I shall ask him and then, whether nether his auspices from now on, or choosing someone from his family – whichever he thinks most suitable for us – 1) that the order of succession exist fixed such that later Bonaparte, the emperor of the French may never be at the aforementioned time King of the Lombards, or of Lombardy or of Italy. 2) that one time our independence has been consecrated inviolably, we should make a treaty direct with France based on the principles of reciprocal equity and mutual utility, ane which establishes the rate of electric current contributions on a less onerous basis, and past which information technology was fixed that once Bonaparte's descendants and the new dynasty should come to power, we would exist exempt for ever and as a event that there would no longer be French troops on our territory."

Marescalchi concluded equally follows: "regardless of everything, I shall end by proverb that yous had ordered me to discover what fate was reserved for united states, and I tin can confirm that it even so depends upon united states of america. You asked me to speak openly, and I have done it. Equally for the first role of what I have written, it is the truth. As for the second, it is what I feel. If I am wrong, do not arraign me."

The interesting characteristic of Marescalchi's note is that it shows Napoleon considering in detail the whole question: he had considered annexation but had ruled information technology out; that he was not a priori against Italian independence, just that time and support will be required; that he was concerned that the people be in agreement with the change of political organization and constitution; that a ruler had to be constitute, fifty-fifty from within his family. The new emperor gives the impression of being the very model of moderation and liberality. There is also withal a subtext to Napoleon's remarks. The reference to annexation could be viewed as an indirect threat. The reference to Melzi'due south position a vice-president could also be read as implying that Napoleon could depose him at volition. We are likewise forced to conclude (despite Marescalchi's impression that the Emperor did indeed have a plan) that Napoleon had non yet come to fixed conclusions. These Italian negotiations came not simply right in the eye of the discussions in corridors and equus caballus-trading over the proclamation of Empire in French republic, a announcement which would already take worried international opinion, but also at the climax of the Moreau-Cadoudal trial. Napoleon's exhortations to the Italians that they should consult bought him time for reflection. In theory Napoleon was positive towards the initiative, only Marescalchi's 2nd signal regarding the lessening of the burden of the military tribute was to prove a more significant stumbling block.

The Italian Republic's desire or voto

Melzi's reply to Marescalchi was dated 21 May. He informed his minister that the Consulta would send ii documents to Paris. One, a decree ordering the edifice of a monument to Napoleon every bit emperor. And a second, a statement of desire (voto in Italian, voeu in French) offer to Napoleon the quality of King of Italy or Lombardy (as he wished). That certificate was dated 28 May, 1804. Article two enjoined the emperor to take the championship 'rex' (although of what was not specified, since information technology was left up to Napoleon to decide what he liked best). Article three imposed that after Napoleon, now head of the Italian republic (sic) could reside permanently outside the state. Article iv noted that kingship of Italy was incompatible with emperorship of France. Article 9 noted that details concerning the majority of the king, the regency, the rights and duties of the royal family etc. would be regulated by a ramble human action written by the Italian Electoral Colleges. Article ten underlined that Italy should be 'politically independent' and 'democratic'. Article xi required French republic to act as guarantor for the Italian Republic and to bring into the agreement the Emperor of Germany and the other friendly power as described past the Treaty of Lunéville. Article twelve allowed a treaty of mutual offence and defense force, but formally refused all dependence and payment of tributes. (The full list of articles is printed in J.-East. Driault, Napoléon en Italie, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1906, p. 296-99.)

All that Marescalchi had mentioned to Melzi is here. For the Italians, the accession of Napoleon or any other member of his family was a step towards independence and freedom from the heavy tribute and troops stationed on Italian territory. Napoleon gave his approval to the 'voto' in a dispatch dated the 29 May and asked the Italians to pursue their reflection. In July, Marescalchi presented the whole project for the constitution. The central part of the document was that it aimed to divide the organs of government into unlike sections entitled the 'Grand Conservatore' ('Neat Conservator'), the 'Supremo Magistrato Conservatore' ('Supreme Magistracy of Preservation'), the Legislative Torso, the National Accountancy and the Courts. The emperor wrote to Melzi on 23 June expressing his blessing of the project and the direction of the 'voto'. ( Correspondance de Napoléon, letter no. 7814.) On eleven July 1804, even so, Marescalchi reported to Melzi, that 'in that location were many things in the certificate which did not please him'. (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, letter 2038, p. 312.) Afterwards this there was radio silence. Napoleon left on his regal journeying to Belgium and the banks of the Rhine (18 July to 12 October). Melzi was probably correct in his annunciation to the Austrian agent in Milan, Businesswoman Moll, on ix July 1804 when he noted: "I recollect that Napoleon has not all the same fabricated up his listen, that he is listening, and that he is leaning towards declaring himself hereditary king of our country…" (Quoted in Albert Pingaud, Bonaparte président de la République italienne, Paris: Perrin, 1914, p. 413, north. 2, time to come Pingaud, Bonaparte.)

Return to the negotiating table

As part of his imperial progress, the emperor had meditated before the tomb of Charlemagne in Aachen, preparing for his ain induction and coronation every bit the new Charlemagne. He had besides come to certain conclusions regarding the fate of Italy. On 11 July, Melzi had written to Napoleon asking him to lower the armed forces tribute paid by the Italian democracy. (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Half dozen, letter 2043, 11 July, 1804.) Napoleon was against and wrote a stinging cannonball to Melzi on 28 Baronial intentionally taking Melzi'south demands that Italy pay a lower military tribute as a threat that the Italians might willingly return to Austrian hegemony. (Sent via Marescalchi, (Correspondance de Napoléon, letter of the alphabet no. 7968).) Melzi was (it is true) in frequent touch on with the Austrian agent, Businesswoman Moll – even using code words in their correspondence to refer to sensitive subjects such as Napoleon, Italy, Francis, etc – but the threat seems far-fetched. And and then, in Mainz on 2 Oct, Napoleon summoned Marescalchi, gave him a peppery reception and demanded that the Italian Consulta come to Paris the post-obit month. "What do these men from Milan desire?" he thundered, "They should watch out! If they want to go back on their discussion they risk existence transformed into French departments. They will be my outposts, they will suffer war and pay for it. Which prince exercise they have in Italian republic whom they could put at their head? It is of no interest to me to be rex of Italia; it is they who must pronounce the will of the people. Have them send me a deputation of some individuals from the Electoral Colleges, the Courts, the Legislative Body, the Legislative Council and the Consulta di Stato. And Melzi had ameliorate be at that place! He must head the delegation and direct the deliberations and then that everything goes according to the rules." (Archivio Marescalchi, cart. 26.) The delegation duly arrived in Paris, non only to nourish the coronation simply likewise to negotiate the new constitution. Afterwards spending the whole month of December in Paris visiting the coronation celebrations without having received a summons, the delegation was finally called to a solemn audience on 30 Dec (in theory to grant them their go out from the coronation celebrations). Here Napoleon suddenly and aggressively addressed them in a long monologue. He informed the Italians that he himself was Italy's salvation, that Italy could no longer remain a Commonwealth or indeed become independent as such, and that she could certainly not become a constitutional monarchy nether an Austrian prince. The choice was between "me or a prince from my family". He then dismissed the Italian enjoining them to summon the Consulta, to use the voto already written every bit a basis for the new document, and to return the new constitution in viii days. (Notes by Valdrighi, quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 431-433.) Since, as Thierry Lentz has pointed out, Napoleon was clearly aware that to take the crown of Italia himself would be a casus belli for Austria, the French emperor turned to the old plan (considered past the Italians back in May 1804), of handing the throne to his elder brother Joseph. Suggestions by Talleyrand encouraged him in the same management. It was hoped that the 'gentle' Bonaparte, the diplomat of Lunéville, would not ruffle Austrian feathers quite and so much.

Joseph, king of Italy?

In November 1804, Napoleon was in total (private) discussions regarding the hereditary nature of the Empire and his desire to accept Josephine crowned Empress. Roederer gives a remarkable account of the stinging interview which he [Roederer] had with Napoleon (dated 4 November, 1804) where the Emperor upbraided him for having placed Joseph too high in status in the establishment of the imperial heredity (should Napoleon die). Napoleon is supposed to accept remarked: "What does Joseph want? He is putting himself in opposition to me, he is acting as a rallying point for my enemies. […] Joseph dares to tell that this coronation [of Joséphine] is contrary to his interests. […] this is to hit me where it hurts. They [the rest of the Bonaparte association, ed.] say that I wish to give Italian republic to Eugène. Good god, I'm not mad! I remember I am quite capable of governing Italian republic; and the state of Venice too. Italia brings me twenty one thousand thousand. If I gave her away, they would make a thou fiddling schemes so as to only give me fifteen." (Roederer, Oeuvres, vol. 3, p. 515.) The important feature hither is that the context is familial. In Napoleon'due south opinion, given the impending coronation of Josephine (and thus the peak of her children), Joseph is concerned that Louis'south children (descended from an Empress) would rank higher than his. (Roederer shows how, for Napoleon, this departure of stance with his previously much loved brother (but of whom he was also very jealous) was decisive, (Roederer, Oeuvres, p. 517): "At another moment, after having said that his blood brother Joseph was trying to oppose him, he [Napoleon] said: 'A month ago I wanted him [Joseph] to live at the Luxembourg palace. Today, I no longer want that'.) This is particularly interesting with respect to Napoleon'southward offer of the Italian crown to Joseph shortly after this interview with Roederer. Every bit Melzi perspicaciously noted (in code) to the Austrian agent Baron Moll on 11 December, 1804: "at that place is no dubiety that if Fumagalli [i.e., Napoleon, ed.] is reduced to conceding preference on this contract to Pietro [i.east., giving the crown of Italy to Joseph, ed.] in light of the events of these days, he volition be reduced to cut off all relations with him." (Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VII, letter 2341, p. 164.) [Via the Paris police, Napoleon was very probably enlightened that Melzi had been communicating with the Austrians during his time in Paris.] In the context of the previous interview, information technology would appear that Napoleon'southward offering of the Italian crown to Joseph had a double purpose (and advantage): of distancing his blood brother and of offering a sop to Republic of austria. Initially Joseph accepted, with an indemnity of 200,000 francs. And Napoleon wrote encouragingly to Francis on New year'due south Day 1805 claiming that he had handed the throne of Italy to Joseph thereby obviated his rights to it.

"In concert with the regime of the Italia, I have ceded all my rights to this country – and which have been mine since the Consulta of Lyons – to my blood brother Joseph. I have proclaimed him hereditary rex of this country, with a clause of renunciation to the crown of France […] such that the two crowns may never be united on the same head.. I have sacrificed my personal grandeur and weakened my ability; only I shall be fully recompensed if I have washed something which your majesty finds agreeable." (Letter of xi Nivôse, An Xiii (1 January, 1805) Correspondence de Napoléon, letter no. 8250, quoted in Thierry Lentz, Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire, vol. 1, p. 119 and note. Napoleon sent like letters to the kings of England, Spain and Naples, merely omitted mention of the 'Joseph solution'.)

But after the initial agreement, further careful negotiation between Napoleon's men (Talleyrand and Cambaceres) and Joseph'south (Roederer and Miot de Melito) took place. The concluding position agreed was that the two crowns would be disassociated until Napoleon'due south decease. If the emperor died childless, Joseph would succeed him in French republic and Louis would supercede Joseph on the Italian throne. However, when on 25 January, Cambaceres came to present Joseph, 'as a model', the text of renunciation which Philip V had accepted to sign after the peace of Utrecht in 1713 in order to go on the throne of Spain, Joseph refused to sign away his rights to the imperial throne of French republic. Carlo Zaghi nonetheless in his long note claimed that that Joseph'due south refusal derived less from disappointment in hereditary terms than from the fact that Napoleon would non requite Joseph consummate independence in Italian republic and would non gratis him from the heavy military machine tribute almost which Melzi had complained. (Melzi, Carteggi, n. 1, p. 228-230. Lucien made a speech in Milan in January (reported past Moll and published in Pedrotti, vol. I, p. 213 and cited in Melzi, Carteggi, p. 230, saying: he would not accept the crown of Italia "if the little beggar (piccolo bougre) doesn't give him complete independence". Come across likewise Joseph Bonaparte, Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph / publiés, annotés et mis en ordre par A. du Casse. – 2e ed. vols I to IX. Paris: Perrotin, 1854-1855, vol. 1, p. 92, where Joseph refers to the heavy tribute which he would take had to pay.)

Louis, king of Italy?

On Joseph's refusal, Napoleon turned to Louis and his offspring. A certificate was elaborated whereby Napoleon would have the crown as protector until the majority of Louis'south son, who would reign in Milan every bit Napoleon Two. (Document quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 437-eight.) Louis was so aggressively against the plan Napoleon is said to accept thrown him out of his role. (See Frédéric Masson, Napoléon et sa famille, vol. 3, p. twenty, quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 438, north. 1.) The negotiation had lasted simply three days (27-30 January, 1805). And then faced with potential embarrassment on a European scale, Napoleon cut the Gordian knot and decided to take the crown himself. He called a 'conseil extraordinaire de cabinet' for five February, where he announced to the nineteen people nowadays (amongst whom, Melzi and five Italian deputies, Joseph, Cambacarer, Champagny, Fouché, Murat and Sieyès) that he would have the crown. The fate of Italy had been decided.

Conclusion

We are left to conclude that Napoleon was entirely serious when he proposed Joseph, following Italian wishes (after all, Marescalchi was one of Joseph's 'party'), as king of Italian republic. This not only would accept deflected Austrian ire but removed Joseph from Paris (and the imperial succession). Joseph refused not only because accepting the Italian crown would non only cutting out of the imperial succession but likewise because he would be left with no room to manoeuvre his new kingdom. But Napoleon had suspected that Joseph would refuse the humiliating conditions. And so he had three autumn dorsum positions, Louis, Eugène or himself. But equally we take seen in the interview with Roederer, Napoleon did non want to requite Eugène that crown. He was never peculiarly convinced past the Louis solution (as Napoleon noted to Marescalchi in the summer of 1804). Paul Schroeder is withal wrong to describe the offering to Joseph as a 'petty one-act'. (Paul Westward. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848, Oxford (United kingdom of great britain and northern ireland): Clarendon Press, 2003, p. 266.) The proposal was entirely serious, but it was but ane of many possible solutions. And perhaps in the terminate, the ultimate solution was the best. For regardless of Austrian displeasure, information technology had the advantage of re-affirming on the European phase Napoleon's identity as the new Charlemagne.

Notes

* In this article, the terms 'Italian/s' refers to the inhabitants of this commencement Italian Democracy and later on Kingdom.
(1) Alain Pillepich, Napoléon et les Italiens, Nouveau Monde Editions, 2003, p. 54.
(2) "Iddio me la diede, guai a chi la toccherà", ("God gave it to me, woe to him who touches it") were the words spoken by Charlemagne when he received the crown as king of the Lombards in 774. They became the ritual words spoken by all those who received the 'Atomic number 26 Crown of the Lombards'.
(3) Recorded by Pierre-Louis Roederer in Oeuvres du comte P. 50. Roederer / publiées par son fils le baron A.M. Roederer,... - Paris : Firmin Didot, 1853-1859, vol. 3, p. 428, time to come Roederer, Oeuvres.
(4) I carteggi di Francesco Melzi d'Eril, Duca di Lodi, La vice-presidenza della Repubblica, vol. VI, Milan 1962, time to come Melzi, Carteggi.
(v) On 30 April, 1804, in the Tribunat, Curée had proposed the famous motion that Napoleon should become 'Emperor of the French', run into La proclamation de l'Empire, Paris: Nouveau Monde Editions, 2001, p. 24-29, and likewise on the website napoleonica.org http://www.napoleonica.org/declaration/pro007.html.
(6) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Half-dozen, letter 1900, p. 158.
(vii) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, letter 1925, p. 178-7.
(viii) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, letter 1926, pp. 178-180.
(ix) In another private alphabetic character to Melzi on the same day, Marescalchi returns to the possibility of a fellow member of the Bonaparte family acceding to the Italian throne. Lucien is rejected because of bad blood caused past his union to Alexandrine Bleschamp. "In my opinion – [Marescalchi's, ed.], setting Joseph to one side – he would refuse it out of hand." Marescalchi was well acquainted with Joseph, acted as his literary advisor and was very much of the elderberry brother's 'party'. The Italian politician went on: "I remember that the most suitable would be Louis, because he is a really practiced man, without pretensions and not defective in judgement and graphic symbol as is thought. Information technology is his son whom the Consul wishes to appoint as his successor, despite the fact that he is just 18 months old. But – for heaven's sake, and betwixt united states of america – Louis is against it out of respect to his brothers. […] You meet more clearly than I do. To dig in our heels nigh remaining a democracy would at present be madness. That he should leave us in full liberty would be worse. But he would never do that. So the best solution sees to me to seize the moment and get the all-time nosotros can for ourselves." Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, p. 182.
(x) As Thierry Lentz has noted (Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire, Paris: Editions Fayard, vol. 1, p. 117) inviting Napoleon to be king was not paradoxical, since it would cut political links with Republic of austria and would also permit the Italians to impose conditions.
(11) The full list of articles is printed in J.-E. Driault, Napoléon en Italie, Paris: Félix Alcan, 1906, p. 296-99.
(12) Correspondance de Napoléon, letter of the alphabet no. 7814.
(13) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. Half-dozen, letter 2038, p. 312.
(14) Quoted in Albert Pingaud, Bonaparte président de la République italienne, Paris: Perrin, 1914, p. 413, due north. ii, future Pingaud, Bonaparte.
(15) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VI, alphabetic character 2043, eleven July, 1804.
(16) Sent via Marescalchi, (Correspondance de Napoléon, letter no. 7968).
(17) Archivio Marescalchi, cart. 26.
(18) Notes by Valdrighi, quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 431-433.
(19) Roederer, Oeuvres, vol. three, p. 515.
(20) Roederer shows how, for Napoleon, this difference of stance with his previously much loved brother (but of whom he was also very jealous) was decisive, (Roederer, Oeuvres, p. 517): "At another moment, after having said that his brother Joseph was trying to oppose him, he [Napoleon] said: 'A month agone I wanted him [Joseph] to alive at the Luxembourg palace. Today, I no longer desire that'.
(21) Melzi, Carteggi, vol. VII, letter 2341, p. 164.
(22) Letter of xi Nivôse, An XIII (one January, 1805) Correspondence de Napoléon, letter no. 8250, quoted in Thierry Lentz, Nouvelle Histoire du Premier Empire, vol. 1, p. 119 and note. Napoleon sent similar letters to the kings of England, Spain and Naples, but omitted mention of the 'Joseph solution'.
(23) Melzi, Carteggi, northward. 1, p. 228-230. Lucien made a speech in Milan in January (reported by Moll and published in Pedrotti, vol. I, p. 213 and cited in Melzi, Carteggi, p. 230, saying: he would not accept the crown of Italian republic "if the little beggar (piccolo bougre) doesn't give him consummate independence". Meet also Joseph Bonaparte, Mémoires et correspondance politique et militaire du roi Joseph / publiés, annotés et mis en ordre par A. du Casse. - 2e ed. vols I to Nine. Paris: Perrotin, 1854-1855, vol. 1, p. 92, where Joseph refers to the heavy tribute which he would take had to pay.
(24) Document quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 437-eight.
(25) Encounter Frédéric Masson, Napoléon et sa famille, vol. III, p. 20, quoted in Pingaud, Bonaparte, p. 438, northward. 1.
(26) Paul W. Schroeder, The transformation of European politics 1763-1848, Oxford (U.k.): Clarendon Press, 2003, p. 266.

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